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ABSTRACT
The likelihood that a U.S. auto company will carry Out some manufacturing
operations in a country is a function mainly of market characteristics such as
aggregate and per capita income, but that likelihood is increased by the impo-
sition of local content requirements. The entry of U.S. parts producers into
manufacturing in a host country is determined mainly by market size and by the
presence of U.S. auto producers and is therefore indirectly promoted by local
content rules.
The scale of production by individual auto producers does not appear to
be increased by a country's imposition of local content requirements and may
even be reduced, with the results that inefficiently small operations
proliferate. The scale of U.S. parts company production depends on market size
and the extent of U.S. auto company activity.
The combination of induced entry of auto and parts producers with no
effect or a negative effect on the scale of their individual operations
suggests that countries imposing these restrictions do raise the aggregate
level of local auto and parts production. However, they presumably pay some
penalty in terms of sub—optimal scale and consequently high costs of
production.
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RESEARCHSUMMARY
yops is
Issues:What factors have been responsible for the pattern of overseas
location of production by U.S.autoand parts producers?
What have been the effects onlocationof local content and
similarregulations imposed by host—country governments?
Results:The dominant influences on location, given the long-standing
institutional constraints that have tended to isolate markets in this
industry, appear to have been economic rather than governmental. In
particular, market size has been the main determinant of production
location. However, local content requirements have had some effect on
companies' location choices. They have pulled U.S. companies into pro-
ducing in markets that some of them would have served from outside if
they could. The regulations have tended to increase the number of U.S.
auto companies producing in a market over what it would have been
otherwise but have not encouraged larger-scale operations. They have
probably tended to bring about fragmentation of markets and inefficient-
ly small scales of operation. Parts producers' location decisions have
not been directly influenced by these regulations hut have been
affected indirectly through the effects on auto company location.
Pcytio
Therehasbeen much concern in the United States about the distortion of
production decisions caused by local content and similar regulations. Aside from
trade effects mentioned below, the subject of a later paper, the distortions of2
production decisions have probably been minor for the U.S. industry, although
they may have been large for some host countries. The main Costs of these
distortions have probably been borne by the consumers in the host countries
themselves. By and large, given the long tradition in the industry ofisolating
markets through government actions, U.S. companies' production decisions have
probably not been seriously distorted by the newer non-tariff forns of
intervention.
Further Research
The data for the paper are, unfortunately, limited to the dates of U.S.
direct investment surveys, the latest of which now available is for 1977. There
is some possibility that the impact of host-country regulation has becomemore
severe since then. This question should be investigated when the 1982survey
results become available for use.
This paper has not addressed the issue of distortions in trade, perhapsmore
severe than those in production and more objectionable to host countries'trading
partners or potential partners. These questions will be discussed in a later
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The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of the
existence and size of manufacturing operations abroad by U.S.companies in
the motor vehicle and parts industry. We analyze the influences that deter-
mined the location of various parts of the industry and in particular the
way in which the location of these activities was affected by host—country
regulations, such as domestic content requirements and subsidies.
The motor vehicle and parts industry is one of the most international
of major U.S. manufacturing industry groups withrespect to the location of
its production activity. The number of employees inmanufacturing opera-
tions abroad was higher than in any major industrygroup relative to U.S.
employment in 1977, with almost as many employees overseas as in the United
States (Table 1). The chemicals industry was the only close rival in this
respect, with the pharmaceuticals subgroup even more international than
motor vehicles. For manufacturing industries as a whole, employment in
U.S.—owned operations in foreign countries was about aquarter of domestic
employment.
Virtually every important company in the motor vehicle industry owns
foreign manufacturing operations, although there are smallsegments of
the industry, such as the manufacture of truck and busbodies, which are
not particularly international. As a result, parents of foreign sub-
sidiaries make up almost the whole industry, while in othermanufacturing—2--
Table 1
Comparison of Overseas Manufacturing Affiliate Employmenta with
U.S. Domestic Employment, by Industry Group, 1977
Parent Companies
ForeignDomestic ForeignForeign Domestic Foreign as
Affiliate Industry as PerAffiliate Emply—Per Cent
Emplo— Emplo— Cent ofErnplo—ment of Domest.
ment ment Domesticment Employ—
(Thous.of Employees) Employm. (Thous.of Employees) ment
Total
Manufacturing 4,855.1 19,443 25.0 5,322.9 11,775 45.2
Foods, Tobacco 436.2 1,581 27.6 484.0 1,017 47.6
Chemicals 614.1 880 69.8 747.1 1,208 61.8
Metals 396.2 2,670 14.8 458.0 1,484 30.9
Nonelect. Mach. 627.4 2,083 30.1 762.5 1,546 49.3
Elect. Mach. 756.3 1,723 43.9 658.6 1,274 51.7
Transp. Equip. 909.8 1,768 51.5 1,083.1 2,289 47.3
Mot.Veh.& Parts 838.0 876 95.7 844.0 1,357 62.2
Other Mfg. 1,115.0 8,739 12.8 1,129.5 2,957 38.2
Excluding petroleum and coal products
Affiliates of nonbank parents
Establishment data
Nonbank affiliates, by industry of parent
Sources: Affiliate and parent data: U.S. Department of Commerce (1981),
Tables I. G 4, II. G 11, II. S 1.
Domestic industry data: 1977 Census of Manufactures,
Vol. 1, Subject Statistics, General Summary, Table 1.—3—
industries they are a small part of the total.
Among parents of foreign subsidiaries the motor vehicle industry had
one of the higher shares of its employees abroad in 1977, almost 40per
cent, while the proportion for all manufacturing was about 30 per cent.
Over a third of motor vehicle sales by U.S. companies (measured by value)
were made by their overseas affiliates and a little over 30 per cent of
assets were in foreign subsidiaries.
The importance of the motor vehicles and parts (or transportation
equipment) industry in total U.S. manufacturing investment abroadappears
to have increased somewhat over the past 50 years orso, as can be seen
below:













Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1953), (1960), (1975), and (1981).
The share in sales (not available for the early years) is muchlarger
than the share in investment, presumably because so much of theinvestment
is in assembly or similar operations heavily dependenton parent firms for
parts and components. The gap between the two measures seems to have risen
somewhat in the twenty years after 1957, possibly as a result of the—4—
Canadian—U.S. Auto Agreement. Taking the investment figures as less
affected by duplication than the sales data, we have the impression of a
rise in the importance of the industry In U.S. manufacturing investment
abroad until the mid—1960's, and then some decline after that. The major
increase in the role of the industry, however, was between 1929 and 1940,
when the U.S. industry's pre—eminence among the world's motor vehicle pro-
ducers was least challenged.
The differences among industry groups with respect to affiliates' depen-
dence on parent exports are shown in the following ratios:
U.S. Exports to Affiliates as
of Affiliate Sales, 1977
Excluding
Total Canada




Machinery exci. elect. 10.3 8.7
Elect, and electronic equipment 11.7 10.9
Transportation equipment 21.0 5.0
Motor vehicles & equipment 21.8 NA
Other manufacturing 9.5 6.9
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1981),
Tables 11.1 4 and II.F 6.
Motor vehicle industry affiliates were far more dependent on imports
from parents than were manufacturing affiliates in general. However, that
high level of dependence on parents reflected largely the activities of
Canadian affiliates; the ratios for those in other countries were similar
to those for the industries least dependent on U.S. materials and com-
ponents. Aside from affiliates in Canada, it was those in the machinery—5—
and electrical equipment industries that were most dependent oncomponents and
supplies imported from the United States.
A good deal of information about the industry group, transportation
equipment, is available from the published data on the 1977 investment sur-
vey. The principal defect in these data as background for our later analy—
sis, which is confined to auto and auto parts companies and affiliates, is
that they include the aircraft industry. However, some informationwas
published about the motor vehicle and equipment industry itself.
Fortunately for our purpose, the motor vehicle industry accounted for the
great majority of affiliate sales of transportation equipment and of other
variables we use, as can be seen in Table 2.
Transportation equipment affiliates in sub—industries other than motor
vehicles and equipment clearly played a negligible role in theactivity of U.S.
majority—owned affiliates and in U.S. firms' exports to such affiliates. Most of
their sales were by affiliates that were not majority—owned, almostentirely in
Europe, and we can therefore eliminate most of their activity from our
analysis by confining ourselves to majority—owned affiliates. We must do
that in any case for many purposes because the non—majority—owned affi-
liates did not report many of the variables we are interested in.
The non—motor—vehicle part of the industry was important in U.S.parent
exports. It accounted for well over two—thirds of exports to unaffiliated
foreigners, and almost 90 per cent of its exports, particularly aircraft,were
sold to unaffiliated buyers.
Among motor vehicle and equipment affiliates, the great bulk of sales
were by those in developed countries. Affiliates in Europe, the oneswe con——6—
Table 2
Division of Transportation Equipment Industry between
Motor Vehicles and Other, for Various Characteristics, 1977
(Unit: millions of dollars)
Transportation Equipment
Motor Vehicles
Total and Equipment Other
Sales by Non—Majority—Owned Affiliates
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U.S. Exports to Majority—Owned
12,651 11,903 747 Affiliates
By product
Machinery 966 959 7
Road motor vehicles and parts 10,530 10,529 1
By location of affiliates
Developed countries 10,771 10,622 149
Canada io,ioo 9,987 114
Europe 445 NA NA
Japan 1 1 0
Australia, New Zealand, S. Africa 225 NA NA
Developing countries 1,035 1,028 7
Latin America 1,020 NA NA
By type of use
Capital equipment 98 96 2
For resale without further processing7,593 7,543 50
Other 4,115 4,011 104
By type of U.S. exporter
Parents 10,175 9,638 536
Others 2,476 2,265 214
U.S. Parent Exports to Unaffiliated
10,474 3,313 7,161 Foreigners
Machinery 2,149 740
Road motor vehicles and parts 1,964 1,795 169
Other transportation equipment 5,735 648 5,105
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1981), Tables II.F6,II.T3,
III.F6, III.H2, 111.12, 111.14, III 1.13, III.T1—8—
centrate on, accounted for about half, and those in Canada for most of the rest.
Minority—owned affiliates were dominant only in Japan, where they were almost
the only ones. They were also relatively important in developing countries:
over a fifth of affiliate sales in these countries as compared to 6 per cent in
Europe and 11 per cent in developed countries as a whole. Within the developing
countries, affiliates in Latin American accounted for almost 90 per cent of U.S.
affiliate sales.
Over a third of sales by majority—owned transport equipment affi-
liates were to affiliated companies, including the parents. The bulk of these
intracompany sales were exports and most exports (over three quarters) were
intracompany sales. However, there were $2 billion in intracompany sales within
the same host countries, probably from parts affiliates to vehicle production
affiliates, and from the latter to distributors. 90 per cent of sales to non—
affiliated entities were local, but there were almost $3 billion across country
boundaries.
European affiliates exported more than 40 per cent of their produc-
tion, while affiliates in developing countries produced almost entirely for
sale in their host—countries. In other words, the developing—country affiliates
were operating in relatively small, isolated markets, while those in Europe
operated in a world—wide or at least continental market. The small amount of
exports from developing—country affiliates was split about evenly between the
United States and other countries, but less than 6 per cent of European
exports came to the United States.
Another distinction between manufacturing affiliates in Europe and
those in developing countries is that the former were almost completely—9—
independent of their parents, and of the U.S. in general, for parts and
components. Imports from the U.S. by majority—owned affiliates in Europe were
less than 3 per cent of their sales, as compared with almost 20per cent for
those in developing countries.
U.S. affiliates all around the world increased their export orien-
tation in the decade before 1977, as can be seen in Table 3. The affi-
liates in developed countries, aside from those in Canada, were exporting
to countries other than the United States. Those In Europe had already
exported about a third of their production in 1966, and that share rose to
over 40 per cent in 1977. Affiliates In developing countries had exported
virtually nothing in 1966 but by 1977 were exporting over 7 per cent of
their production, about half of which went to the United States. In two of
the locations with relatively large U.S. affiliate production, Brazil and
Mexico, the export ratios were higher, and Mexico exported mainly to the
U.S. Affiliates in Venezuela, however, did virtually no exporting,
although their sales, in the aggregate, were larger than those of Mexico.
Since the Venezuelan market appeared to offer as much opportunity for achieving
scale economies as the Mexican market, one might guess that the difference bet-
ween the two countries owed something to government intervention.— 10—
Table3
Exports and Total Sales by U.S. Majority—Owned Transportation































Source: Lipsey and Kravis (1982), Table A—i.
Sales
1966 1977
All Countries 11,156 48,685








II.THE LOCATION OF OVERSEAS MANUFACTURING
a. General Factors in the Location of Multinational Firm Activities
While many of the earlier discussions of the behavior of multinational
firms were based mainly on theories of international trade and capital
movements, it has become clear that such considerations alone explain only
a small part of the phenomenon. Following the work of Buckley and Casson
(1976), Caves (1971), (1974), (1982), Dunning (1971), (1974), Horst (1974),
Magee (1977), and others, it is increasingly recognized that the explana-
tion of the behavior of multinational firms requires a mixture of the con-
siderations that are part of International trade and finance with those
that are usually thought of as Industrial organization issues.
The application of trade theory to the exporting decisions of multina-
tionals has usually started with the assumption that a purely competitive
world leaves no room for such firms and that a minimum departure from such
a world is that individual firms must be assumed to possess some firm—
specific advantages that give them the ability to sell in foreign markets
in competition with local firms. These advantages give the firm some niche
in each market——some demand, not infinitely elastic, for its products. The
trade and investment problem is then the allocation between production and
exporting, or in more elaborate analyses, among production, exporting, and
licensing, as ways of serving this demand and maximizing profits. In this
framework, the decision to invest and the decision to export from the home
country are a single decision. The relation between production in a market
and home—country exports to that market is necessarily negative, if pro-
perly measured.— 12—
Theauto industry, at least in the early days, presented an unusually
clear case in which the direct investment involved a flow of technology
rather than of capital. The Ford subsidiaries in both Canada in 1903 and in
the U.K. in 1911 were established with no monetary capital investment by
the parent company but with their contribution of the company name, "...
patents,highly—valuable designs, 'know—how,' and technical assistance."
(Maxcy, 1981, pp. 64—66, and Wilkins and Hill, 1964, p. 18).
The limitations of this model were pointed out by Horst (1974) among
others and demonstrated by the fact that the expected negative relationship
has proved extremely elusive in empirical studies. For one thing, major
investment decisions are long—term ones, while decisions about how to
supply a market are probably made more frequently, with the location of
producing facilities taken as given for short and even intermediate
periods. More important, perhaps, is that the main reason for establishing a
foreign plant is often not to minimize cost but to shift the demand curve in the
firm's favor. There are many ways in which this can happen. Many buyers, espe-
cially governmental, may have a preference or even an absolute requirement for
locally produced items. A local plant provides assurance to the buyer of a
complex product that the seller has a long—term interest in and commitment to
the market and is likely to provide continued service facilities. A local plant
may make it easier for a producer to tailor its product or part of its product
line to local needs and preferences. Local production of some items may be
required by the government as the price for permission to import the rest of the
line. The reputation of locally produced items may increase the demand for the
rest of the firm's products.— 13—
Anaspect of several of these factors affecting the demand for a
firm's products is that they involve multiproduct rather than single—product
firms. That does not necessarily mean that they straddle many SIC or SITC
groups. At the minimum, the multiple products may be only slightly dif-
ferentiated versions of what is essentially the same product. However, ...
inactual practice, virtually all multinational firms are also multiproduct
firms"(Horst1974).
b. The Segmentation of Motor Vehicle Markets
The location of the motor vehicle industry and various elements of its
operations around the world have been determined, to a larger degree than
in most industries, by governmental actions and regulations. Among the
earliest of these were high tariffs on imported vehicles and the high tax
rates on fuel in European countries. Both of these tended to segment
markets so as to limit the importance of imports as a source of supply. In
the case of fuel taxes, the effect was to segment markets not only
geographically but also by the characteristics of cars, with the European
(and later, Japanese) markets geared to smaller cars than the U.S. market.
In recent years, the forms of government intervention have multiplied, the
current ones being mainly the many types of local content requirements,
monopoly rights, subsidies, and other devices prevalent in almost all deve-
loping countries, some of which have now been proposed also for the United
States. The history of the trade and investment by U.S. motor vehicle com-
panies is therefore a tale of continuous adaptation not only to changes in
economic circumstances, labor cost, capital cost, transport cost, market
location, and other changing elements of comparative advantage, but also to— 14—
changesin the extent and types of government intervention.
Almost from the earliest years of the motor vehicle industry, govern-
ments seem to have been determined to reserve as large as possible a share
of their markets for production within those markets. A Canadian tariff of
35 per cent on complete cars, but lower on parts, was one of the induce-
ments for Ford's initial Canadian operation (Wilkins and Hill, 1963,
p. 15). The British duties of 1/3 on car imports imposed during World War I
led to a declaration by Ford that...inthe near future Ford cars sold in
the UK will be entirely of local manufacture...". (ibid, p. 102). The Australian
assembly industry developed behind a war—time prohibition on imports of complete
cars to conserve shipping space (ibid, p. 124). Anincrease in the German tariff
on autos and parts, passed in 1927 "...soundedthe death—knell for American
assembly plants there." (ibid, p. 160).
Tariffs encouraged local market production but did not determine that
it should be of products different from those in the home market. Measures
to base excise taxes on horsepower and to tax fuel heavily performed that
function. The English Finance Act, effective in 1921, imposed a tax based
on the number of cylinders and their diameter, which raised the price of
the Ford Model T well above that of competing British cars (ibid, p. 142) and
through the 1920's "...thesmall car competitors relentlessly harried the
Ford." (ibid, p. 145).
The segmentation of markets for automobiles was described many years
ago. In a list of reasons for separate organizations in Europe, Southard— 15—
(1931)observed that:
"Certain of these market differences are imposed by
abnormal fiscal conditions. For example, the annual tax on
a 20 horsepower automobile in 1928 was, in England, $153,
in France $32.50, and in Germany $200. Taxes of this
magnitude on cars of moderate horsepower, coupled with
higher priced gasoline, has developed an artificial motor-
car market in Europe which places the mean far below
20 horsepower. With the bulk of the European market thus
demanding a low—powered car, the American motor—car pro-
ducer is faced with a difficult marketing situation which,
barring a resumption of a more normal taxation and a
higher level of purchasing power, can only be met by the
production of a car which, in the main, is unsuitable for
the American market.*"
"*It is this abnormal tax situation, in the final analy-
sis, which, rather than tariffs, has given effective pro-
tection to the European motor—car producer."
The segmentation of markets that resulted from these government
actions as well as from other characteristics of the United States and
European markets can be observed in data for the mid—1960's, before the
rises in the price of oil and government responses to it greatly altered
the pattern of consumer demand. One indication is given by the distribution
of weights of cars produced in the United States and in four European
countries, the U.K., Germany, France, and Italy.— 16—
Numberof Domestically Produced CarModels,
by Weight, 1964
U.S. Europe
Weight (lbs.) No. % No.
Under 1,200 0 0 4 2.8
1,200—1,599 0 0 19 13.5
1,600—1,999 0 0 47 33.3
2,000—2,399 3 1.5 29 20.6
2,400—2,799 49 25.1 20 14.2
2,800—3,199 6030.8 11 7.8
3,200—3,599 5226.7 9 6.4
3,600 & over 31 15.9 2 1.4
Total 195 100.0 141 100.0
Source: Kravis and Lipsey (1971), P. 513.
Some models with very small production were not
included in the sample.
Over 70 per cent of European production was In a range of sizes below
all except 1 1/2 per cent of U.S. production. Almost three quarters of U.S.
production was in size ranges that included only 15 per cent of European
production. The lack of overlap between the car sizes of the different
markets was even more extreme for the United States compared with continen-
tal Europe.
A similar comparison can be made for horsepower. Almost two thirds of
the European models were below the level of the lowest horsepower U.S.
car, and four fifths were below the level of all but 5 per cent of U.S.
models. Almost two—thirds of U.S. cars had higher horsepower than all but
about 3 per cent of European cars.— 17—




Under 50 0 0 2618.4
50—74 0 0 6546.1
75—99 9 4.6 24 17.0
100—149 61 31.3 22 15.6
150—199 5226.7 1 .7
200—249 24 12.3 2 1.4
250—299 23 11.8 1 .7
300 & over 2613.3 0 0
Total 195 100.0 141 100.0
Source: Kravis and Lipsey (1971), p. 512.
Some models with very small production were not
included in the sample.
Another indication of the segmentation of markets is that differences
in the level of taxes and in the ability to take advantage of scale econo-
mies for cars of different types led to extreme disparities in
"estimated"domestic prices between cars of typical U.S. specifications
and cars of foreign specifications. Estimated prices for an "average"
U.S. car were three times as high in Europe as in the United States, while
estimated prices for an "average" foreign car were only 10 per cent higher
than in the United States. Estimated U.S. prices for the smallest of five
types were more than a third higher than European prices, while estimated
European prices for a large, standard U.S. car were two and a half times
the U.S. price (Kravis and Lipsey, 1971, pp. 590 and 517). While these
prices are highly conjectural as estimates of what cars not being produced
'Prices in each country for each type of car estimated fromseparate
country equations relating car prices to car characteristics.— 18—
ina market would have cost if they had been produced there, they do represent
actual price gradients for the characteristics of the cars that were being pro-
duced. In this sense they do indicate the degree to which these two markets
were isolated from each other. A similar analysis conducted for 1969 found
European prices for the U.S. mix of cars 20 to 84 per cent above U.S. prices and
for each country's own mix, 15 per cent below to 4 per cent above U.S. prices.
The corresponding estimates for Japan were 11 per cent above the U.S. for the
U.S. car types and 11 per cent below the U.S. for Japanese car types (Kravis,
Kenessey, Heston, and Summers, 1975, pp. 115—116). Recent events ——inparticular
the difficulty U.S. producers have had in manufacturing small cars economically
in the U.S. ——suggestthat very different technologies and production functions
evolved in the U.S. and other countries as a result of this market
segmentation.
While the segmentation of the world market into European production on
one hand and U.S. and Canadian production on the other shaped the relationship
of U.S. companies to the European market, the segmentation introduced by deve-
loping countries after World War II was of a somewhat different type. The
interventions were more elaborate and specific and varied widely among the
countries according to the sizes of their markets and the degree to which they
thought foreign producers could be induced to shift production. The industries
built up were more inward—looking than those that had grown up in Europe, each
country developing production almost entirely for its own market. The tendency
was to fragment the industry, even at the cost of diseconomies of small—scale
production. It has only been after a considerable period of such policies that
some of the developing countries have begun to add export incentives or— 19—
requirementsto local content regulation and to move towards accepting
integration into worldwide production networks as a substitute for self—
contained motor vehicle industries as ultimate objectives.
In a world of segmented markets in which there were no differences in
income levels, tastes, factor or materials prices, no economies of scale,
and no costs to a firm of transferring its technology from country to
country, we would expect to find multinationals' production geared to the
location of markets. Differences in income levels would lead to a predic-
tion of higher levels of production in higher—income countries, if demand
for autos is income elastic. Allowing for economies of scale would lead us
to predict still further concentration of production in large markets,
since costs and prices would be lower there. Allowing for some amount of
trade among countries, even with high transport costs or other barriers,
would also add to the tendency towards concentration and the disappearance
of production in the smallest markets, since the economies of scale might
outweigh the transfer costs. High costs of transferring technology to some
locations because of wide differences in language or customs would
discourage production there. High labor costs would presumably discourage
the location of production.
The effect of local content requirements or similar cost—increasing
measures is not so easy to anticipate and may be particularly hard
to measure because the existence of the requirements may itself be a func-
tion of the other variables, such as market size, that we use to explain
the entry and level of activity of U.S. firms. Local content regulations
were seen by developing countries as a way of encouraging foreign invest—— 20—
mentIn the hope of stimulating industrial growth. They may have been con-
sidered to be more effective than tariffs as a way of promoting entry since
there were no indigenous auto companies In these countries to take advan-
tage of tariff protection. A government can guarantee that its market will
be closed to a firm that does not comply with the regulation. It also is able to
limit the number of entrants into the market and thereby give an entrant the
chance to reach a scale of production that is not too uneconomical, something
tariffs alone could not do. Often one sees local content regulations combined
with different forms of investment incentives including tax and tariff con-
cessions and subsidies which effectively lower the cost functions for the
entering firms and may allow them to return a profit even if the costs of pro-
ducing in an LDC tend to be higher than elsewhere because of the lack of infra-
structure, the inability to realize economies of scale, and the requirements for
local content.
The enactment of local content regulation may be directed at purposes
other than forcing entry. Another possibility is that it is a way of
extracting some rents from the foreign investors for the host—country
government, especially when these rents have been created by other host—
government policies. In this case also, the size of the rents to be
extracted may be related to the market size and other variables determining
location.
In a small market, local content requirements may reduce the probabi-
lity of location. Production on a small scale without imported components
may be so inefficient and expensive that a company would rather lose that
market than comply with the regulations, and the effect on probability of— 21—
entrywould then be negative over that range of market sizes (see Baranson,
1969, and Picard, 1970, for estimates of the effects on costs of small
scale and high degrees of local integration).
In some of our analyses we use investment incentives as a variable in
addition to local content requirements. While local content requirements are
cost—increasing, investment incentives should be cost—reducing and should,
therefore, be a positive influence on both the probability of investing and
the size of operations. Unlike local content rules, investment incentives may
have stronger effects in non—segmented markets, since they may increase the
profitability of production for sale in many markets.
We have not used the investment incentive variable as frequently as the
local content rules in our analyses. One reason is that our information on
incentives, confined to answers to the 1977 Department of Commerce invest-
ment survey, lacked data for countries with no U.S. investors. For this
reason it could not be used in analyses across all countries. Another
problem is that the presence of U.S. affiliates was strongly correlated
with that of local content requirements. In Europe, few affiliates reported
local content rules without also reporting incentives. The local content
variable, therefore, represents a combination of the two. In developing
countries, there were local content rules without incentives but hardly any
incentives without local content requirements. The incentives variable in
that case, therefore, represented the combination of the two regulations,
while the local content variable represented the effect of local content
rules without incentives.
We have here the possibility of two measurement problems. One is that— 22—
agovernment may give up or avoid local content legislation if such regula-
tions would cause firms to abandon or not enter the country's market. We
would then not be able to observe the negative relationship between local
content legislation and entry, and our results would be biased toward a
positive relationship. The other problem, related to the first, is that of
simultaneity bias; while local content regulations may increase the proba-
bility that a foreign company will locate production in a host country,
the likelihood that a government will decide to enact and retain such
legislation and the stringency of its provisions may not be exogenous.
A country may not have local content legislation but would impose it
if any company proposed to enter or began production there. Second, larger
levels of affiliate production may imply a greater commitment to a market
and therefore tempt the host government to impose conditions on the firm's
continued activity there.
Examining the timing of legislation and entry may give us some hints
as to the importance of the simultaneity issue. If it were found that
entry tended to follow legislation with a relatively short lag while
legislation did not tend to follow entry we would be more willing to ignore
the simultaneity issue in our statistical analysis.
We do not include tariffs at this point and believe that tariffs have
not played as important a role in encouraging investment in LDC's as they
did earlier in the developed countries. Of the countries which have
imposed local content regulation for automobile companies, over 3/4's are
developing countries.— 23—
c.The Decision to Locate or Probability of Entry
In this investigation we have treated the automobile companies separately
from the parts producers. The auto companies sell mainly consumer goods for
which product differentiation, brand names, and reputation among buyers are
probably important. The parts producers, on the other hand, sell mainly to
auto and truck manufacturers, both U.S. and foreign. They may be constrained
more by cost considerations and may be able to depend for their firm—specific
comparative advantage on their worldwide reputations rather than on the
knowledge of each country's buyers. They may also, to some extent, be captives
of the auto companies, locating in a particular country because the auto com-
panies are there. In some cases, the auto producers were reported to have
persuaded the parts producers to follow them.2
For the auto companies we expect the probability of entry to be
affected by the size of the market, as measured by the population or income
of the country. If markets were largely isolated by distance or governmen-
tal restrictions we could think of this as a demand factor. Alternatively,
2Referring to Brazil in the late 1950's, Gordon and Grommers (1962,p. 58)
wrote "A major factor in the decisions of almost all participating parts manu—
facturers was persuasion by the vehicle makers. One company...wasinitially
not inclined to move into Brazil. When a number of vehicle manufacturers, which
are the company's main customers in the United States, suggested that it pro-
vide technical assistance to a local Brazilian firm, it had little choice but
to follow this suggestion. Another company was much influenced by the fact that
its main U.S. customer ...wanteda U.S. supplier of the part concerned in
Brazil and that if this supplier would not come, the customer would have to ask
someone else ...themaker did not want to run the risk that a smaller com-
petitor might edge into its domestic market by supplying its U.S. customers
satisfactorily in Brazil." Following the same pattern, Japanese parts pro-
ducers are reported to be joining Japanese auto producers in the U.S. See,
for example, "Suppliers join Honda in Ohio," N.Y. Times, July 6, 1984, and
"Nippondenso to Build Car Parts Plant in U.S.," Wall Street Journal, August 10,
1984.— 24—
wecan think of market size as a cost factor: location within a large market
Is a way of minimizing the cost of supplying that market, eliminating
transport or other costs of supplying products across national boundaries.
Another cost factor in a particular market Is the cost of labor or
other factors of production. The existence and nature of government regula-
tions is also a cost factor, determining not only the cost of supplying the
market from outside but also costs of operating inside the market. We assume
that capital costs are a parent—firm characteristic rather than a country—
of—location characteristic; that is, for any one firm they do not differ
among countries.
The demand for parts company products is partly a derived demand. It
would be desirable to include among the parts company decision variables, the
activity of auto companies in that country where that is possible. The point
at which manufacturing in a country becomes profitable for a parts company
would be affected by whether and at what level auto companies locate their
manufacturing and assembly affiliates there. A fact that suggests such depen-
dence is that there are hardly any parts company plants in countries without
U.S. auto company plants. Parts companies' location choices would also be
would also be affected by labor and other costs and by government regulation
of not only their operations but also those of their main customers, the auto
companies. They would be influenced by market size, aside from its effect on
auto company location, through its effect on the market for replacement parts.
The decision to locate implies a yes—no response from the firm and
therefore necessitates the use of a statistical technique appropriate for a
binary dependent variable. We posit that a profit maximizing firm has an— 25—
estimateof the potential return from investment In each country. This
potential could be measured by a Continuous index, 1*, which is unobser-
vable. We are, however, able to observe its sign. When 1* is greater than
0 we observe investment in a country and we define 1=1. Otherwise,
We postulate that auto company jts tendency to invest in country I is
defined by
(1) I. =aW. +aM +a LDC. +a REG1. + ii2i 3 1 4 1 i
*
where I. 1 when I.. > 0
13 1J
=0otherwise
W. =averagerelative wage in country i, adjusted 1
for the quality of labor.
LDC. =1if country i is an LDC;
1
0 otherwise
M. =thesize of the market in country i.
REG1 =1if local content regulations exist in country i
=0otherwise
The logit model estimated for the probability of entry by auto companies is:
P.
(2) Log1 —'
= W. + a M. + a3 LDC. + a4 REd. +
We expect, that
(1) < 0 .Wedo not have an adequate measure of the price of labor of
3We could also define I =somecontinuous function, ax + e, when 1* is
greater than 0. That involves the use of a TOBIT estimation technique, as
seen below.— 26—
aparticular quality in country i. If the measure we use, real income per
capita, acts as a proxy for the price of labor, we expect the probability that
an automobile company locates a manufacturing affiliate there to be negatively
related to It. If, however, it acts as a proxy for the level of development of
country i or the level of discretionary income of consumers in country i, we
expect a positive coefficient.
(2)a2 > 0 .Thelarger the market the greater the saving in
transport cost, market information, tariffs, etc. from locating production there.
(3) a < 0 .Weassume that, given the size of the market and the
price of labor, the cost of building and installing plant and equipment may
be higher in LDC's because support services are scarce, replacement parts
may be difficult to obtain and labor training costs may be high. The
overall risk may be higher, including the risk of expropriation of either
assets or profits.
(4) a40 .Wecannot predict the effect of local content regula-
tions, for reasons described earlier. In a sufficiently attractive market
the effect should be to increase the probability of location.





÷ a3LDC1 +a4AUTOi ÷ a REG1 +
where I. =1when I. > 0
3 13
= 0otherwise
AUTO1 =1if at least one manufacturing affiliate of a U.S.
automobile company is located in country i
=0otherwise— 27—
REG1=1If domestic content regulation exists in country i for
auto affiliates
=0otherwIse
For parts companies we would expect:
(1) a1 < 0
(2) a2 > 0
(3) a3 < 0 •Thereasons for our expectations regarding
a1, a2, and
a3 are essentially the same as for auto companies.
(4) a4 > 0 •Partscompanies "follow" auto companies abroad.
(5) aS > 0 .Localcontent regulation imposed on automobile companies
may encourage parts companies to locate in those countries. In order to
satify such requirements, auto companies may demand that those parts com-
panies that do business with them in the U.S. follow them to countries
which do not allow the automobile industry to importparts.
III. Empirical Results
a. Logit Analysis of Location
The logit specification is estimated using the maximum likelihood
method first with data on 114 countries and then for threegroups of countries
separately. First we look at the location behavior of automobilecompany affi-
liates, then of parts company affiliates. Finally we touch on the simulta-
neity issue by treating local content regulations as dependent variables.
The exact definitions of the variables we use are given in thenotes to
Appendix Table A—i.— 28—
Thefirst set of equations attempts to explain the presence of at least
one U.S. automobile company affiliate, whether it is a manufacturing or non—
manufacturing affiliate. Local content regulations encouraged entry into a
host country. The dummy variable for a developing country was, as expected, a
consistently negative influence and per capita income a positive influence
on probability of entry. Although each of these two variables had a
smaller coefficient when the other was introduced into the equation, It
remained significant. In other world, status as a developed country in our
classification does seem to have some meaning beyond per capita income, and
while per capita income does not seem to perform as a measure of the price
of labor, it does have some influence other than as another way of defining
status as a developed country. Another indication of this influence Is that
in equations for developing countries alone, per capita income remains a
positive influence on U.S. affiliate presence. Coefficients for the regula-
tion variable are larger in equations for developing countries, suggesting
its stronger effect on entry there. If we confine the analysis to the pre-
sence of manufacturing operations, only the local content regulation
variable is a consistent influence, always positive. The LDC and per capita
income coefficients do remain negative and positive respectively, but are
not always significant.
In addition to the probability that at least one U.S. auto firm would
locate a manufacturing affiliate in a particular country, we can also calcu-
late the probability that a particular firm would locate an affiliate in a
country. In the first set of equations already described (A—i to A—13), if at
least one firm located an affiliate in a country, it was recorded as what— 29—
couldbe called 100 percent location. In thefollowing equations there are
four observations for each country: the decisionsof each of the four auto
companies to locate or not to locate in thatcountry. If one of the four
auto companies had at least one manufacturing affiliatein a country, that
would be recorded as L=1 for that firm in thatcountry. If a company did not
locate an affiliate in that country, we woulddesignate L=0 for that firm in
that country.
This disaggregation by company largely confirmed theresults in the
equations for any U.S. presence. For all affiliates,including non—
manufacturing, higher per capita income encouraged entry, classificationof a
country as developing was a negative influence, both were significantwhen
they were included in the same equations, andper capita income was signifi-
cant within the group of developing countries.
The distinction between results for Europe and thosefor developing
countries comes out clearly in the equations forentry by manufacturing
affiliates. Per capita income was a significantpositive influence on entry
in developing countries but not in Europe, while marketsize, as measured by
aggregate national product, was significant in Europe, but notconsistently
in developing countries. A possible interpretation ofthis difference
would be that the size of the market forautos, for which GDP is only a
rough proxy, depends on both total and per capita income indeveloping
countries, among which per capita incomes vary greatly, but is wellrepre-
sented by aggregate GD? in developed countries,among which per capita
income levels do not differ so much. Localcontent regulation appears to
have been a stronger encouragement toentry in developing countries than in
Europe.— 30—
Aswe mentioned earlier, it is likely that the existence oflocal con-
tent requirements in a country is notcompletely independent of the country
characteristics that would induce entry even withoutthe regulations. We
have made a test of that possibilityby trying to predict the existence of
these regulations, as with equations (4) and (5):
(4) REG1 (AUTO) =J5**LDC.+1..O** 1nGDP771
(5) REG11(AUTO)=.97lnGDP77i _J.9** RGDPC77. x2
**= significantat 1% level
When GD? is included with GDPper capita or the LDC variable they are all
consistently significant at the 1 percent level. Asexpected, the fact
that a country was an LDC increased theprobability that it would impose
local content regulations on an automobileaffiliate. Alternatively, we
can say that a higher level of per capita Income decreasedthat probabi-
lity.
Given that a country was an LDC, the larger thesize of its local
market, the greater the probability that it would have localcontent
legislation. A country with a very small local marketmight find that con-
tent regulations simply discouragedany entry at all by destroying the pro-
fitability of local production or assembly. Itmay be that the smaller LDC's
needed to include a package of local contentlegislation and subsidies to
convince firms to enter.— 31—
Theequations for the entry of any U.S. parts company (Table A—2) show
that the most consistent, and always positive, influencewas the existence of a
U.S. auto company manufacturing operation in the market. Market sizewas a posi-
tive influence on entry, even when auto affiliatepresence was included in the
equation. Income per capita was positively related to entry and classification
as an LDC negatively related, and the two variables (really two versions of the
same variable) were little affected by the inclusion of the automanufacturing
variable. The story was different for the indicator of local contentregulation.
That variable virtually disappeared when auto manufacturingpresence was
included, an indication that such regulation attracted parts companies by
attracting auto manufacturing operations rather than through their effect on the
purchasing behavior of already existing U.S. auto companies.
Another indication of the relation between motor vehicle affiliates and
parts affiliates is given by Table 4, which shows the dates of first manu-
facturing in three countries by motor vehicle and parts affiliates of U.S.
companies. We have picked the dates to emphasize the clustering of initial
manufacturing dates but the timing does suggest that either the parts affi-
liates followed the path of the motor vehicle producers or thatthey both
responded at certain times to changes in host government regulations. The
latter explanation is reinforced by the Brazilian case. Two of themotor
vehicle affiliates arid nine of the parts affiliates were established in
1957—60, soon after enactment of a program for the establishment of an
automobile industry. This program, which called for increases in the
"national composition" of vehicles (measured by weight) toover 90 per cent
between 1956 and 1960, followed an earlier one which deniedimport licenses— 32—
TABLE4
Dates of First Manufacturing by U.S.—Owned Motor Vehicle





Affiliates Dates of First Manufacturing
Argentina Before 1959 1959—61 1962—65 1966—67 1968—71
Motor Vehicles 5 0 3 0 2 0
Parts 12 1 5 1 5 0
Brazil Before 1957 1957—601961—6619671968—71
Motor Vehicles 3 0 2 0 1 0
Parts 16 4 9 0 3 0
Mexico Before 19591959—60 1961—52 1963—64 1965—71
Motor Vehicles 3 0 1 0 2 0
Parts 10 1 3 0 4 2
Source: NBER company questionnaires. Local content legislation was
enacted in 1956 in Brazil, 1958 in Argentina, and in 1962 in Mexico.— 33—
forproducts that were made in Brazil (Gordon and Grommers,1962). In
Argentina, eight out of seventeen affiliates, in Brazil, elevenout of
nineteen, and in Mexico, six out of thirteen were established withinfour
years or less after the enactment of local content legislation. The fact
that these were not the same years in all countriessuggests that the con-
centration in time does not reflect simply developments inthe U.S. or in
the parent companies.
The concentration in time of these beginnings ofmanufacturing produc-
tion are also revealed in a more comprehensiveset of data summarized in
Table 5. The Brazilian share of new U.S.—ownedmanufacturing subsidiaries
in the motor vehicles and equipmentindustry rose from 4 per cent in all
the years before 1951 to 21 per cent in1956—59, just after the establish-
ment of the program described above. The share ofArgentina reached a peak
of 15 per cent in 1960—63 and that of Mexicoa peak of 75 per cent in
1956—59. The timing of entry seems to be closelyassociated with the
enactment of local content regulation.
To summarize these results, we cansay that local content regulations
applied to affiliates of auto companies seem to have increasedthe probability
that a U.S. auto company or a U.S.parts company would locate a manufacturing
affiliate in a country. The effect seems to have beensomewhat stronger in deve-
loping countries than in Europe. Larger market size raisedthe probability
of entry by both auto and parts affiliates. Thefact that a country was an
LDC decreased the probability for both, whilehigher per capita income
increased it, even among LDC's. Also, larger marketsize and being an LDC
significantly increased the probability that local contentregulations were
in force in a country.— 34—
TABLE5
Datesof First Manufacturing by Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S.Companies
Motor Vehicles and Equipment (SITC 371)




Pre—1951 75 2 3 2 3 4 3
1951—55 15 1 2 1 7 13 7
1956—59 48 5 10 7 10 21 15
1960—63 75 11 3 6 15 4 8
1964—67 81 5
Source: Vaupel and Curhan (1969), p. 227.— 35—
b.The Level of Affiliate Activity
In an earlier study of influences on theforeign activity of U.S.
firms (Lipsey and Weiss, 1976), net salesor net fixed assets of U.S. affi-
liates were related to various measures of marketsize, foreign (non—U.S.)
affiliate activity, distance from the United Statesand Europe, and EEC
membership. It was found that the only consistent influenceon U.S. affi-
liate activity in the auto and truckindustry in developed countries was
the size of the market, as representedby GDP or imports of all manufac-
tures. In some equations, EEC membership was asignificantly negative
influence. The presence of non—U.S.—owned auto andtruck affiliates and
distance from the United States andGermany had no visible effect. In the
parts industry, size of market again was a positive andsignificant
influence on U.S. affiliate activity, but therewas also a positive rela-
tionship with the presence of foreign—owned manufacturingaffiliates and,
in the best equations, a negative influence ofdistance from the United
States. Distance from Germany and EEC membership hadno apparent influence.
The positive market size coefficientswere interpreted as reflecting econo-
mies of scale, since the developed—country marketswere not segregated from
each other and there was, therefore, no needto manufacture in a large
country to have a market there. The positive relation of U.S.to foreign
affiliate activity might have representedsome degree of rivalry for
markets between firms in the United States and thosein other countries or
differences in government policies thatencouraged both United States and
non—U.S. affiliates or discouraged both, although thelatter is a more
likely explanation for the developing countries.— 36—
Inthe developing countries Lipsey and Weiss found little to explain
U.S. affiliate activity. Only the extent of foreign affiliate activity
seemed to have any relation to the level of U.S. affiliate activity, and
that was a positive one. Within this group of countries this relationpro-
bably reflected government policy more than anything else.
Thus, of the variables mentioned earlier, market size appeared to have
been the main influence on the level of activity of U.S. affiliates in the
motor vehicles and parts industries, at least In the developed countries,
and we believe this relationship reflected the influence of economies of
scale. U.S. parts companies were apparently motivated by both rivalry with
foreign producers and possibly by governmental regulations, such as
domestic content requirements, not included in these equations, to be more
active in countries where foreign—owned parts producers were located.
We would expect that the level of activity a firm would choose for its
affiliates in a country, given the initial decision to invest there, would
be a function of the size of the market, the average income level there,
whether the country is an LDC (unless that characteristic is completely
Identified by average income), the existence of various regulations on and
subsidies for operations there, and the length of time thecompany had been
operating in that country. The general relationship is described by:
(6) NFAS. f(GDP., GDPC., LDC., REG1., REG2., YRSAV.,. 13 1 1 1 1 1 ij)
where,aside from variables described earlier:
NFAS.. =the"activity" variable which is total net sales in country i
of all affiliates of any parent j investing in country I, minus all— 37—
imports,including those from its parent, those from other affiliates
within the firm and those from unaffiliated foreign enterprises.
It is similar to local value—added or, more accurately, local acti-
vity. This Is somewhat broader than value added, since it includes
not only value added within the affiliate but also purchases from
other producers within the host country, including other U.S.
affiliates. A variant is net local sales (NLFAS), net of all
imports. These are sales in the host country, excluding exports,
net of all imports related to host—country sales, which are estimated
as total imports multiplied by the ratio of local to total sales.
Other variants are net sales of manufacturing affiliates (NFASM) and
sales affiliates (NFASAL) separately.
YRSAV.. =theaverage date of establishment of all of parents j's affi-
liates in country i.
We expect a negative relationship between the date—of—
establishment and activity variables since the longer acompany has
been in the market of a particular country, the better it knows the
market and the longer it has had time to acquire brand recognition and
acceptance. Since the variable is not the age of the affiliate but
rather the date of establishment, the negative coefficient for date
represents a positive relationship with age.
GDP. =GrossDomestic Product of country i. We expect a positive
relationship between market size and the level of activity.
GDPC. =GrossDomestic Product per capita of country i, either as aproxy
for wage level, in which case we would expect a' negative rela—— 38—
tionshipwith affiliate activity, or as a proxy for development of
infrastructure, in which case we would expect a positive rela-
tionship.
LDC =1if country is a developing country
=0otherwise
We expect a negative relationship between the level of activity chosen
and the characteristic that a country is an LDC.
REd. =1if country i has local content requirements.
=0otherwise
Here we are not quite sure what to expect. Even if local content
requirements encourage entry, it is not clear how they affect
the level of activity once an affiliate locates in a country.
REG2. =1if country i offers investment incentives such as tariff con-
cessions or subsidies.
=0otherwise
We expect investment incentives, since they lower costs to the
affiliate, to encourage larger size of operations.
Affiliates located in Europe and those located in the LDC's were
treated separately. The two areas are dissimilar not only in terms of the
levels of development, but also in terms of the extent of government inter-
vention. Europe, especially the EEC, can be looked at as offering
something closer to what one could consider one large market for prospec-
tive investors. Economies of scale could be realized and intra—firm trade
rationalized. Affiliates in one country could specialize in one particular
model or component and trade with affiliates specialized in other models or— 39—
componentsin other countries. The potential for this type of utilization of
economies of scale may have influenced both the decision to locate and the
level of activity chosen.
Although our main interest is in manufacturing activity, rather than in
sales, research, or service operations, we did run some equations in which
the dependent variable was the net sales of all affiliates of autocompanies.
The speculation behind those calculations was that salesaffiliates, for
example, were not a clearly distinct class from manufacturing affiliates but
that affiliates were on a continuum from those that only handled salesto
those that assembled cars from wholly or partly importedcomponents to those
that manufactured complete cars. Since manufacturing activities would have
high ratios of net sales to total sales and sales activities low ratios,we
thought that our net sales variable might be a good proxy for the amount of
manufacturing activity. If that had been the case, we should have been able
to explain net sales of all affiliates better than net sales of only those
classified as manufacturing. This did not turn out to be thecase, probably
because sales and service activities do requirevery substantial value added.
We therefore report mainly the equations for activity of affiliates charac-
terized as manufacturing, shown in Table B—i, although we refer to those for
all affiliates, in Table B—2, with their greater numbers ofobservations, for
some slightly different results.
In the equations for all countries, only two variablesconsistently and
significantly affected the level of activity of manufacturing affiliates of
individual U.S. auto companies: market size and thepresence of local content
requirements, the latter a negative influence. There were weak indications of— 40—
thepossible influence of two other variables: date of establishment and country
per capita income. The longer a company's affiliates had been established in a
country, the higher their level of production. Production was also larger in
countries with higher per capita Incomes, suggesting that this variable was
acting as a proxy for stage of development rather than for the price of labor.
Identification of a country as developing had no significant relation to output,
whether or not income per capita was included in the equation.
If we look at Europe and the developing countries separately, at the cost of
limiting the numbers of observations, we are more successful in explaining manu-
facturing activity in Europe. Market size was clearly a positive influence. Less
consistently, period since establishment was associated with higher production
and local content requirements with lower production. In the developing
countries, while the signs of the coefficients were the same, only market size
was a significant variable. The positive relation between per capita income and
affiliate activity vanished completely when Europe and the developing countries
were separated, a further indication that the coefficient in the worldwide
equation represented the effect of the level of development.
The levels of activity for all affiliates are much less well explained than
those for manufacturing affiliates across all countries. The positive influence
of period since establishment is more consistently significant, but no negative
influence of local content requirements is visible. However, investment incen-
tives appear here to have had a strong positive influence on activity. Within
Europe, only market size and period since establishment were significant influen-
ces, and among developing countries only market size.
The most important result here is that we can find no evidence that local— 41—
contentregulation increased the level of a U.S. affiliate's manufacturing acti-
vity in a country. It may even have reduced it by increasing production cost.
In combination with the earlier result that such regulation increased the proba-
bility of entry, the implication appears to be that local content regulations
increased the number of U.S. firms in a country imposing them but tended to
reduce their average scale of operations, if it had any effect at all on scale.
In other words, it fragmented production among larger numbers of units, perhaps
smaller and presumably less efficient ones. A longer period of operations In a
country seems to have added to a firms's level of output, perhaps through the
increase in local familiarity with its products. There is some slight evidence
that investment incentives Increased output, but the effect is only visible for
affiliates in general, a fact which suggests that it operated mainly on affi-
liates classified as non—manufacturing.
Overall, then, we seem to find that while there was some evidence that
domestic content regulation increased the probability of investment and
production in a country by U.S. auto firms, we could see little indication
of significant effects of these regulations on the average level of acti-
vity. Measures of market size alone explained the scale of manufacturing
affiliate activity quite well, especially in developing countries.
We assume that parts company affiliate activity was determined largely
by the same variables used for auto company activity. The only variable
NFAS =f(GDP,GDPC, LDC, REG1, REG2, YRSAVI, ANFAS)
different from those discussed in the case of automobile company affiliate
activity is the ANFAS variable which is the aggregate level of activity of— —
allautomobile company affiliates in a country. We expect partscompany affi-
liate activity to have been positively related to the level ofactivity of auto-
mobile company affiliates.
We had less success In explaining the levels of activity of affiliates of
U.S. parts producers than of auto company affiliates. None of the hypothesized
influences seemed to have any effect on activity levels in Europe. Indeveloping
countries, the strongest influence, and the only consistently significantone,
was the level of activity of U.S. auto company affiliates in the aggregate.
However, aggregate auto company affiliate activity in developing countries
2
was so strongly correlated with market size (r > .80) that we cannot
distinguish clearly between them as influences on parts company affiliate
location. The parts companies do appear to have been drawn todeveloping
countries by the auto companies but to have located in Europe forreasons other
than the individual country characteristics we include. As weexpected, the size
of individual country markets and auto company locationwere not important in
Europe; the parts companies were apparently able to treat Europe as a single
market.
The contrast between the apparent success of local content regulation in
inducing entry and its lack of influence on the amount of a company'spro-
duction and local purchases given that the firm was alreadyoperating in
that country may be a confirmation of the analysis in Dixit and Grossman
(1982). They expected local content requirements to expand therange of
processes performed in the country, a phenomenon that may be reflected in
the increase in the number of auto and parts manufacturingaffiliates, but
not necessarily to increase output. The anti—protective effect isasso—— 43—
datedin their paper with low elasticity of factor substitution. A low
elasticity of substitution between labor and physical capital in the motor
vehicle industry was found in an analysis of factor substitution within
multinational firms (Lipsey, Kravis, and Roldan, 1982) in data for 1966
from a complete census of U.S. direct Investment abroad, butnot in 1970
data from a sample of large companies.
TOBIT Analysis of Affiliate Activity Levels
If we expand our analysis to include observations forno location, that is,
where the level of activity of a firm in a country could be'0', we are then
dealing with a censored sample in which data are clustered at a limit, and
therefore use TOBIT analysis.4
As in the LOGIT, we have four observations for eachcountry: the decisions
of each of the four auto companies to locate or not locate inthat country. If
a firm does locate in a country we do not in this case record thatsimply as a
yes response but look at the level of net sales for the affiliates of that firm
in that country.
*
Wedefine I. ,ourlevel of desired or potential level of affiliate
ii
activity as
*I..=aW. +aM. +aLDC. +aREG1. +E. ii2i 3 i 4 i i
and define our model as




The results of these calculations are presented inAppendix Tables C—i and
C—2, the first confined to affiliates classified as manufacturing andthe second
4Although TOBIT analysis assumes a normal rather thanlogistic (as was
assumed for the LOGIT) cumulative distribution of theerror terms, the two
distributions produce empirical results which arevery similar.— 44—
includingall affiliates.
We find, again, a very strong and consistent influence of marketsize, as
measured by real GDP. The larger the market, the higher the affiliateproduc-
tion. Within Europe, that was the only clearly important influenceon a firm's
production level.
Among developing countries, three other variables were almost always
significant. The higher a country's per capita income, the higher the affiliate
production. If the per capita income was not included in the equation, classifi-
cation of a country as developing was associated with loweraverage affiliate
output, and that classification appeared to have some negative effect in the
equations for all types of affiliates, even if per capita income was accounted
for.
The existence of local content regulation appeared to raiseaggregate affi-
liate output in developing countries, even though earlier resultssuggested that
it did not increase the average scale ofany one company's operations. This
result presumably reflects the influence of local contentregulations in
inducing production by firms that would otherwise not have entered these
markets .5
To the extent that the regulations induced entry at sub—optimallevels of
operation for individual firms, there may have been some penalty in the form of
high costs of production paid by host—country residents (see, forexample, Munk,
51n the TOBIT, the expected value of allobservations can be decomposed
into "the expected value conditional upon being above the limit andthe probabi-
lity of being above the limit" (McDonald & Moffitt 1980). Sinceour limit
observations tend to be at least 50% of the sample (sometimes 80 &90%) it is
not surprising that the total effect of local content regulationon activity
was a positive one. The positive effect of local content regulationson entry
dominated the zero or negative effect of these regulationson scale.- 45-
1969).We tried to find some evidence of this in the data on prices of motor
vehicles relative to other goods and services from Kravis, Heston, andSummers
(1982). However, while there were wide disparitiesamong countries in motor
vehicle prices, they were explained mainly by per capita income,or better, by
whether the country was listed as developing, and by a dummy variable for the
existence of a motor vehicle manufacturing industry. Developed countries had far
lower relative prices for motor vehicles and, givenper capita income or stage
of development, countries with motor vehicle industries also had lowerprices.
Dummy variables for local content requirements showed coefficients that were
positive but far from being significant. The lower prices in countries with
motor vehicle production, despite the likely inefficiency of much of thatpro-
duction, suggest that prices paid by consumers were determined more by tax
rates than by costs of production or importing.
IV •SUMMARY
The worldmarket for motor vehicle and parts has been the object of
government interventions for the last 50 years to a greater degree than
most manufactured products. Those interventions, particularly those in
favor of small cars, were one cause of the split between the kinds ofcars
produced in Europe and those produced in the U.S. and Canada. Thatsegmen-
tation of the world market probably insured that U.S. companies,even in— /45—
theiryears of greatest technological leadership, would serve European
markets largely through production there rather than by exporting. However,
that development might have come eventually in any case.
Beginning in the 1950's and 1960's developing countries began much more
active efforts to force the establishment of local motor vehicle
industries. Since this is an industry in which economies of scale are
important, the establishment of local industries could impose high costs on
local consumers, and there have been many examples of uneconomic produc-
tion. Multinational companies adapted to extremely low levels ofpro-
duction in some countries by importing most components and limiting local
activity to assembly. Where local content requirements were increased, the
companies tended first to take advantage of the differences in economical
scale levels for different parts of their products, beginning local produc-
tion or purchasing with those for which economical production could be
achieved at the lowest levels. When higher levels of local content were
enforced, the companies moved toward negotiating arrangements to offset
imports by exports, achieving what scale economies they could then by
having plants in different countries specialize in different parts of the
vehicles and export to other countries. We have tried here to observe the
extent and nature of that adaptation, concentrating on such variables as
size of markets, levels of production, and government interventions suchas
local content requirements and investment incentives. The results are sum-
marized in Table 6.
The probability that a U.S. auto company would carry Out some manufac-
turing, including assembly, in a country was a function of market charac—— 47—
Table6
Signs of Coefficientsa for Main Location Variables
Auto. Co.
PerDevelop—Affiliate
Market Capita ing Presence orAge of Local Invest.












Probability of Entry (LOGIT)
Auto affiliates: All countries + + — +
Europe + +
Developing
countries (+) + ÷
Parts manufacturing affiliates + -F
Probability of REG1 (LOGIT) + +
Level of Activity of Existing Affiliates (OLS)
Auto affiliates: All countries + (+) — —
Europe + (—) — (—)
+
+
LDC + (—) Parts manuf. affil.: Europe
LDC (+) + (+)
Level of Activity of All Affiliates (TOBIT)
All cmtries + + — +
Europe +
(+)
Developing countries + + +
aCoefficients with t—statistics > 1.Those with t—statistics > 1 but < 2 are in
parentheses.
Source: Tables A—i, A—2, B—i, B—2, B—3, C—i, and C—2.— 48—
teristicssuch as aggregate and per capita income. The probability of entry
also seemed to be increased by the presence of local content requirements. The
probability of entry by manufacturing affiliates of U.S. parts companies was
determined by market size and the presence of a U.S. auto company manufacturing
affiliate, both of which had positive effects. Per capita income and the
existence of local content requirements on auto producers appeared to influence
parts company affiliate location only through their effects on auto affiliate
entry. A strong link between the enactment of local content requirements, the
entry of U.S. auto companies, and entry by U.S. parts companies is also
suggested by the time series data.
We distinguished between the probability of entry and the extent of
affiliate production, both for those affiliates that were operating (a
measure of the average scale of production) and for all potential affi-
liates (an indicator of aggregate production). The scale of production of
existing auto and parts company affiliates was to a large extent a function
of market size and, for parts producers, the extent of the activity of U.S. auto
affiliates. We could find no evidence that local content requirements increased
the scale of host—country output of cars by U.S. affiliates. In fact, it
appeared that local content requirements may have led to lower scales of output
by U.S. auto affiliates, although evidence for this is weak. There are signs,
but only weak ones, that the levels of output of auto affiliates in Europewere
increased by the presence of investment incentives. Since investment incentives
are cost—reducing while local content requirements are cost—increasing, there is
some logic to this outcome.
Auto company affiliate output, but not that of parts company affi—— 49—
hates,was higher, the earlier the date of establishment of the affiliate.
That fact suggests that auto companies, selling mainly toconsumers, gained
market share from a long period of acquainting consumers with acompany's
name and products, while parts companies, selling mainly to producers, did
not. The parts producers may have been able to draw on their customers'
experience with them in other countries, as auto producers could not.
It appears that at least the developing countries, and possiblysome
European countries, were able to increase the levels of local output by firms
in general —thatis, aggregate local output —throughlocal content
requirements. The penalty was apparently that the production by each individual
firm was at a scale below the optimum, with the probable result,although we
have no direct evidence, that costs of production were higher.— 50—
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3.18 —2.2 1.4 468
(2.3) (7.4) (4.5) 84at1
2.13 .506 —.76 1.8 468







































































































































































AUTOi =1if at least one affiliate (manufacturingor non—manufacturing)
of any U.S. auto company operated incountry i. =0otherwise.
AUTOM=1if at least one manufacturing affiliate ofany U.S. auto company
operated in country i.
=0otherwise.
AUTO1
=1if at least one affiliate of U.S. autocompany j operated
in country 1.
=0otherwise.
AUTOMi =1if at least one manufacturing affiliate of U.S.auto company j operated in country i.
=0otherwise.
REG1 =1if a country imposed local content requirements.For most
countries, the data were from U.S. Department of Commerce,
1981, where the definition we used was that aforeign affiliate of any
automobile company in country i answered "yes"to either question
47 or question 48. These asked whetheras a condition for operation
the affiliate was required to "import nomore than a certain amount"
(47) or "acquire a minimum of inputs locally' (48).For other
countries the data were from a variety of sourcesincluding U.S.
auto companies, Robinson (1983), U.S. Department ofCommerce (1980)
and (1983), and U.S. Department of theTreasury (1982).
=0otherwise.
LDC =1if country i is an LDC (a country outsideEurope other than the
U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and SouthAfrica). =0otherwise.
RGDP =realGDP of country i in 1977, a measure of marketsize, and real and GDP per capita of country i in 1977. Theestimates were extrapolated
RGDPC1 from those for 1975 in Kravis, Heston, andSummers (1982) by methods
described in Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978)and (1980).— 58—
TableA—2
Coefficients of LOGIT Equations for Presence of Parts Company Mfiliates
Independent Variables
No.
Dependent RGDPj LNGDP1 RGDPCj LDC1 REG1j AUTOM1 Obs.
Variable
A—37 PARTj 5.56 —1.85 .806 118
(1.7) (3.1) (1.3) 20 at 1
A—38 .487 —1.65 .223 118
(2.2) (2.6) (0.3)
A—39 .438 .343 .554 118
(1.9) (2.2) (0.8)
A—40 .459 —1.431—.451 1.376 118
(2.1) (2.2) (0.6) (1.9)
A—41 5.21 —1.618 1.499 118
(1.6) (2.6) (2.4)
A—'2 4.64 .216 —1.008 .225 1.385 118
(1.4) (1.1) (1.2) (0.3) (1.9)
A—43 PARTM1 5.42 —1.34 1.43 118
(1.9) (1.8) (2.1) 12 at 1
A—44 4.69 .343 —.367 1.7 118
(1.7) (1.4) (0.4) (2.3)
A—45 .865 —.806 .478 118
(2.8) (1.03) (0.6)
A—46 .878 —.385 —.791 2.317 118
(2.6) (0.5) (0.8) (2.4)
A—47 4.76 .241 —.256 .383 2.258 118
(1.6) (0.9) (0.3) (0.4) (2.4)
A—48 5.42 —.831 .169 2.409 118
(1.9) (1.1) (0.2) (2.6)
Notes:
PART1 =1if at least one affiliate of any U.S. parts manufacturing
company operates in country 1.
=0otherwise.
PARTM =1if at least one manufacturing affiliate of any U.S. parts
manufacturing company operates in country i.
=0otherwise.— 59—
TableB—i
Coefficients ofOLS Equations For Activity of All Auto Manufacturing
Affiliates of U.S. Auto Companies














































































2,988 —42 —3.2 —103
(4.7) (0.8) (1.3) (1.0)— 60—
TableB—2
Coefficients of OLS Equations For Activity of All
AutoAffiliates of U.S. Auto Companies











B—li 2,590 —10.1 544 .32 80
(5.3) (2.9) (0.4)
B—12 2,414 49.2 —8.9 14.2 .32 80
(4.8) (1.2) (2.4) (1.0)
B—13 2,309 —7.0 314.8 .36 80
(4.7) (1.9) (2.3)
B—14 2,160 37.2 —6.3 329.2 .36 80
(4.3) (4.3) (1.7) (2.3)
EUROPE
B—15 4,750 —19.8 96.8 .57 39
(5.7) (3.3) (0.4)
B—16 4,430 103.7 —20.1 276.4 .58 39
(5.1) (1.1) (3.3) (1.0)
B—17 4,400 —18.1 225 .58 39
(4.8) (2.9) (0.9)
B—18 4,860 —19.7 .58 39
(6.2) (3.3)
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
B—19 2,770 —1.4 —64.3 .57 31
(5.7) (0.9) (0.9)
B—20 2,700 .58 31
(6.6)
3—21 2,860 —1.9 —71.8 .57 31
(5.4) (1.1) (0.9)— 61—
TableB—3
Coefficients of OLS Equations for Activity of Manufacturing
Affiliates of U.S. Parts Companies








REG1j LDC1 ANFAS R No.
Obs. F'
ALL COUNTRIES
B—22 163 4.38 42.5 17.43 —6,646 —1.90 .05 78 1.7
(1.6) (0.6) (0.0) (1.0) (0.3) (0.3)
B—23 176 .09 8.7
(3.0)
B—24 1.64 —19.97—20.358 6.01 .04 1.8
(0.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.6)
EUROPE
B—25 187 26.78 —3.24 .03 44 1.5
(1.1) (1.0) (0.4)
B—26 176 5.34 29.57 —3.47 .01 1.1
(1.1) (0.3) (1.1) (0.4)
B—27 180 262.8 29.00 —2.77 .01 1.1
(1.1) (0.2) (1.0) (0.3)
B—28 179 .05 3.4
(1.8)
B—29 —.32 5.49—.02 0.6
(0.2) (1.1)
B—30 5.43 39.39 3.92 .00 1.1
(0.4) (1.4) (0.7)— 62—
TableB—3 (cont.)
Coefficients of OLS Equations for Activity of Manufacturing
Affiliates of U.S. Parts Companies








REG1j LDCj ANFAS R No.
Obs. F
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
B—31 —193 16.76 26.1 .32 23 4.4
(1.7) (1.3) (2.8)
B—32 —194 —.154 16.95 26.1 .28 3.1
(1.6) (0.0) (1.1) (2.7)
B—33 —210 —1.20 96.25 25.8 .40 4.6
(2.0) (1.9) (0.8) (2.9)
B—34 80 38.03 .08 2.0
(1.2) (0.3)
B—35 93 .12 4.0
(2.0)
B—36 13.0 .28 9.6
(3.1)
B—37 —0.96 10.2 .33 6.5
(1.6) (2.3)— 63—
TableC—i
Coefficientsof TOBIT Equations for Activity of Manufacturing




























































































Coefficients of TOBIT Equations for Activity of All
AutoAffiliates of U.S. Auto Companies
Independent Variables
Eq.DependentRGDP LNGDP RGDPC1 LDCj REG1j No.
No.Variable Obs.
ALLCOUNTRIES
C—il NFASjJ 34.2 —1.07 .674 468
(5.0) (6.6) (4.3) 83 non—limit
C—12 29.3 .266 —.30 .849 468
(4.2) (4.9) (1.3) (5.0)
C—13 .305 —.90 .304 468
(5.2) (5.3) (1.7)
C—14 36.1 .203 —.39 468
(5.2) (4.0) (1.8)
C—15 .325 .163 —.37 468
(6.1) (3.1) (1.6)
C—lb NLFAS 31.8 —1.04 .854 468
(4.6) (6.3) (5.3)
C—17 .349 0.84 .443 468
(5.5) (4.7) (2.5)

























LNGDPj RCDPC1 LDC1 REG11
C—19 NFASj
C— 20
C—21
C—2 2
C—2 3
66.1
(5.5)
—.30
(1.01)
58.6
(4.5)
.173
(1.6)
—.83
(0.0)
.551
(4.8)
—.40
(1.3)
DEVELOPINGCOUNTRIES
.247
(3.5)
368